In critical energy infrastructure sectors (e.g. electric power generation, natural gas transportation, oil refining capacity) maintaining certain level of excess capacity is socially valuable (as it serves to protect against unexpected market conditions) but not necessarily compatible with the incentives for individual firms in the market. In this paper, we develop a dynamic oligopoly model with a stochastically growing demand to analyze the inherent tension in market-based incentives for capacity expansion where capacity additions take place over long time lags. Our results indicate that the market fails to induce the socially optimal level of capacity. However, the magnitude of this failure varies greatly as a function of entry costs and the relative profitability of investments in the market (as measured by the ratio of maximum markup over production costs and investment costs). In general, the likelihood of insufficient capacity in equilibrium increases with decreasing probability of demand growth, increasing discount and depreciation rates and/or increasing investment and/or production costs. We discuss the public policy implications of our results.
Introduction
Modern economies are extremely dependent on the reliable performance of many capital intensive energy infrastructure sectors (e.g. electric power generation, natural gas transportation, oil refining capacity). In many of these sectors, capacity expansion decisions are made under significant uncertainty about demand growth as new capacity only becomes operational after extended time lags. In the past, the determination of capacity expansion plans resulted from joint analysis conducted by regulated firms and government agencies which allowed the pass-through of capital costs at regulated rates. 1 Optimal capacity expansion plans involved a certain level of excess or idle capacity required to stand-by in case of unexpected supply disruptions and/or demand spikes. In the new context of deregulation, regulated monopoly structures have given way to highly concentrated oligopolies in which capacity expansion decisions have new strategic implications. Faced with the prospect of demand growth, firms may increase their market shares. However, adding more capacity may also induce tougher competition in the short-run, as firms try to improve their installed capacity utilization levels.
The extent to which market based incentives induce appropriate levels of investment (from a social standpoint) is therefore unclear. In this paper, we are interested in analyzing the trade-off implicit in market based incentives for capacity expansion. We develop a dynamic oligopoly model with a stochastically growing demand. Within each period, installed capacity is fixed and the firms compete in quantities. At the end of each period they decide on investments that determine increments in their capacities for the next period. From one period to another, installed capacity depreciates and the structure of demand may change to reflect growth. Our aim is to characterize equilibrium levels of investment when firms (although strategic in the short run) behave "almost competitively" in deciding on new investments, that is, even though they certainly exercise market power in the short-run, their investment decisions are only dependent upon simple summary statistics, namely the current level of capacity. In other words, defining current capacity stocks as the "state" variable, we concentrate our analysis on Markovian strategies for capacity expansion. The focus on Markovian policies enables a strategic decoupling between the short-run capacity constrained Cournot game and the capacity expansion game (operating in a longer time frame). The main conclusion of the paper is that the market fails to induce the socially optimal level of capacity. However, the magnitude of this failure varies greatly as a function of entry costs and the relative profitability of investments in the market (as measured by the ratio of maximum markup over production costs and investment costs). In general, the likelihood of insufficient capacity in equilibrium increases with decreasing probability of demand growth, increasing discount and depreciation rates and/or increasing investment and/or production costs. Our paper is aimed at enlightening recent debates in critical energy infrastructure industries (electric power generation, natural gas transportation, oil refining) regarding the market's ability to deliver the 'right' amount of new investments over time. Our model indicates that altering industry structure by splitting one of the incumbents does not affect the equilibrium capacity utilization factor because strategic capacity withholding behavior is also affected by the structural change. Our model also indicates that a forced divestiture has a rather marginal impact on the aggregate level of idle capacity. Interestingly, tax and depreciation incentives aimed at decreasing investment cost, achieve both an increase in aggregate investment and a reduction of the equilibrium capacity utilization factor.
In the context of electricity markets, our characterization of investments suggests that artificially low price caps exacerbate the market's failure to provide socially optimal levels of investment. However, our results indicate that socially optimal levels of investment will not be induced by simply increasing price caps. This contrasts with a conventional wisdom according to which, relaxing price caps induces socially optimal investment. Insurance against no demand growth is in this case, a more effective policy intervention. Interestingly, electricity markets seem poised to innovate in this regard as various proposals (some already operational) for "capacity markets" effectively allocate the risk of uncertain demand growth to consumers. The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we survey the existing literature on oligopoly models and capacity expansion. In section 3 we introduce our model and the capacity expansion game. In section 4, we provide a characterization of equilibrium expansion plans for duopoly case. In section 5, we characterize the equilibrium number of firms under free entry. In section 6, a benchmark or lower bound for socially optimal capacity levels in the long-run is developed. Section 7 provides a discussion on the public policy implications of our results. Finally, in Sections 8 and 9, we discuss the possibility of more complex equilibria and offer our conclusions.
Literature Review
Modeling the interaction between short-run and long-run incentives for expanding capacity in an analytically tractable fashion is a challenging task. To address this challenge, many authors have taken different methodological approaches ranging from analytical efforts under highly stylized assumptions to detailed numerical exercises. In Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) , firms build capacity at bounded rates and demand is constant over time and profits are not discounted (instead, it is assumed that firms maximize average profit). Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) show that in addition to the equilibrium identified by Spence (1979) (in which firms accumulate capacity to reach the Stackelberg equilibrium) there are equilibria in which the firms maintain less capacity (e.g. they can even attain the monopoly total capacity and split the profits). Another strand of literature is industry specific. For example, in the oil and natural gas industry, a recent statement by the Western Governors Association (see WGA (2004)) calls attention to "..markets conditions (which) have resulted in the operation of this interstate pipeline and refinery network near its capacity with little margin of unused capacity to accommodate disruptions". A lack of excess refining capacity has often been blamed for recurring high gas prices during peak demand periods (see The Economist (2007)). According to Fernandez et al. (2006) little excess refining capacity exacerbated the effects of hurricane Katrina in the US gasoline markets. In electricity markets, the long-run reliability of the system depends on adequate investments in new generation capacity. Unexpected changes in operating conditions over extended periods of time (e.g., low level of seasonal water inflows or an equipment failure that may keep a large power plant from generating electricity for weeks or even months) may result in significant disruptions. In a recent paper, Bushnell and Ishii (2007) have developed a quite flexible general framework to model the capacity investment in the deregulated electricity markets. They allow the firms to make investment decisions sequentially and simulate equilibrium market outcomes for various scenarios. They conclude that the incentive of individual firms to invest strongly depends on their position in the market, i.e. a dominant firm tends to keep tight capacity supply in an effort to maintain higher prices. Our paper differs from Bushnell and Ishii (2007) in various respects. Our model is highly stylized thus limiting the range of questions that we can effectively address. However, we do not rely on simulation results to support our conclusions. In public policy debates, it is commonly argued that competitive electricity markets have a self regulating ability to induce the socially optimal level of supply reliability in the long run (see Joskow (2006) ). According to this view, only some distortions (e.g. price caps), remaining from the regulated era, stand in the way of achieving efficiency. Nonetheless, there seems to be increasing support for "capacity markets" as a means to ensure adequate levels of installed capacity (see Cramton All these examples point to an inherent tension between market-based incentives and the ability to withstand major supply disruptions in a critical infrastructure where investment has long lags.
The Model

Short Term Equilibrium
Two capacity constrained firms indexed by i ∈ {1, 2} compete in the "short-run" to supply demand.
We assume a simple functional form for the residual demand the duopolists face, namely P =p − σQ, where Q is demand, andp and σ are two positive constants. Assuming constant marginal costs which we shall denote by c > 0, the short-run profits are given by
where m =p − c and q i is the production level of firm i. Given production capacities K i < ∞, we derive Cournot equilibrium for all possible configurations of production capacities (for details on the derivation see Appendix, Section 10). In Region Figure 1 ), aggregate capacity is relatively low and firms produce up to capacity in the Cournot equilibrium. Hence, the short-run equilibrium profits are given by
}, aggregate capacity is relatively high, and in equilibrium, the capacity constraints are not binding. Consequently, in the remainder of this paper, whenever (K 1 , K 2 ) ∈ IV (σ) we shall describe this situation as one with "excess capacity". Note that m 3σ is a "capacity withholding threshold", i.e. firms withhold capacity in equilibrium whenever
. The short-run equilibrium profits are given by
With highly asymmetric capacity levels, i.e. in regions
2σ }, the smaller firm produces up to capacity in equilibrium. Thus, in the case of region II(σ), the short-run equilibrium profits are given by:
Demand Growth
We first introduce a model for demand growth. The slope σ of the (residual) inverse demand decreases randomly over time to reflect the net effect of overall demand growth. Thus, if σ t is the slope of the inverse demand function in period t, then in period t + 1,
σ t with probability θ σ t with probability 1 − θ which implies that when there is growth,
, where g > 0 is the growth rate (see Figure 2 ). Note that the price elasticity of demand remains constant:
This is in notable contrast with other models of demand growth (e.g. the one used in Murphy and Smeers (2005) ) in which the price elasticity of demand does change over time. For the remainder of this paper, we shall assume, with no loss of generality that σ 0 = 1. We close by remarking that a model of supply-side disruptions (under stationary demand) would follow a similar structure: i.e. with probability θ, installed capacity suffers a depreciation shock 1 1+g .
Equilibrium Capacity Expansion
Given capacity levels (K t 1 , K t 2 ) at time period t, firms accrue their equilibrium profits in the short run,
t ) and simultaneously choose capacity investments Y t i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. Assuming a constant marginal cost of investment is κ > 0, firm i's net profit for period t is the difference between the profit from the product market and the investment costs for new capacity, i.e.
. New capacity will be available at the start of the next period and the old capacity depreciates at a rate 1 − δ where δ ∈ (0, 1), so the capacity for next period is
Let r denote the discount rate and β = 1 1+r the associated discount factor.
A Simple Two-Stage Game
To gain some insight into the structure of incentives for providing excess capacity, we start by developing a simple two-stage model (with no depreciation) in which firms choose their capacity levels
in the first stage, and then in the second stage, uncertainty over demand is resolved and demand structure remains fixed for an infinite number of time periods.
, firm 1's expected value is given by:
Note that when there is growth, firm 1's marginal value is decreasing in the capacity levels of both firms. The first order condition (which is also sufficient) leads to the best reply function of firm i:
In a symmetric equilibrium K * 1 = K * 2 = K * , and using the fact that
θg . If there is no growth, excess capacity is θg , which could be interpreted as the rate of return adjusted for random demand growth. However, it is reasonable to assert a priori, that this model is likely to oversimplify matters. For instance, given that when it occurs, excess capacity is infinitely-lived firms may be overly conservative in determining investment levels. In reality, a situation of excess capacity dissipates over time as demand continues to grow and installed capacity depreciates. The other potential outcome in this model is an infinitely-lived situation of "tight" capacity. This is also not realistic as high profit margins are likely to incentivize new entry thus potentially creating excess capacity. Thus, only a fully dynamic model is capable of revealing how the interplay between temporary excess capacity, uncertain growth, depreciation and potential entry is resolved in equilibrium. This is the subject of our next section.
A Dynamic Model
In a model where demand could potentially experience growth infinitely many times, we need to start by assuming that the expected rate of growth is bounded above by r, i.e. θg < r (or equivalently that β(1 + θg) < 1). This implies the industry's total discounted revenue over an infinite horizon is finite.
We restrict our attention to stationary Markovian investment strategies: i.e. the investment decisions of the firms in period t depend exclusively on the current capital stock K t = (K 1 , K 2 ) and the current value of the parameter σ t , say σ.
) denote the profile of capacity investments given a "state" (K, σ −1 ). We remark that profits R * i (K, σ −1 ) are homogeneous of degree 1 (which in this setting can be seen as profits having constant returns to relative scale):
The reader can verify that this property also holds for regions II(σ), III(σ) and IV (σ). Note that investments costs are also homogeneous of degree 1 (as they are assumed to be linear). Consequently, having constant returns to scale in both equilibrium payoffs in the short-run and investment costs, we restrict our attention to investment strategies which are also homogeneous of degree 1. This allows us to reduce the dimensionality of the "state" variable as we can rewrite
and concentrate on strategies of the form Y (k, 1) where k = K σ −1 = σK is the capacity relative to demand. Given an investment strategy (homogeneous of degree 1) we define the relative or detrended capacity state trajectory as follows:
with probability θ δk t i + y i (k t ) with probability 1 − θ
. In the analysis that follows, we concentrate entirely in the relative capacity space. Given initial state k, the net present value of equilibrium payoffs obtained by firm i, given an investment strategy y(k), say v i (k|y), satisfies the recursive equation
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and to ease notational burden, we write R * (k) instead of R * (k, 1). We are interested in Markovian investment strategies that have the following property:
at every time period, for any given state, no firm can do strictly better by choosing a different decision than the one prescribed by the strategy combination under consideration. This concept known as Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) formalizes a notion of recursive rationality, i.e. play prescribed by the strategies from any state off the equilibrium path must also be in equilibrium (see Chapter 13 on Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Maskin and Tirole (2001)) . As a refinement of Nash equilibrium, this solution concept filters out all "non-credible" Nash equilibria, i.e., those equilibrium strategies supported upon the basis of irrational play off the equilibrium path. A second advantage of MPE pertains to the simplicity of Markovian strategies which substantially reduces the number of parameters to be estimated in dynamic econometric models (see for instance, Ericson and Pakes (1995)).
Definition: An investment function y * is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of the stationary
Characterization of Markov Perfect Equilibria
Next, we provide a characterization of excess capacity levels attainable by MPE. To simplify notation, in the remainder of the paper, we shall write I, II, III and IV to refer to regions I(σ), II(σ), III(σ) and IV (σ) when σ = 1. Depending upon parameter values, there are cases that lead to excess capacity in the long-run. Strategy y * pertains to the condition the MPE investment equilibrium we have identified do not induce excess capacity in the long-run. Based on the initial relative capacity prior depreciation k, we partition the entire relative capacity space R 2 + into 4 regions as figure 3 indicates
Figure 3: Regions in relative capacity space
The symmetric investment strategy combination under consideration y * is formally described as follows
0 otherwise where
and ϕ(k) is a function to be defined later. The intuition behind strategy combination y * is relatively straightforward (see Figure 4) . In situations in which both firms are heavily overinvested (i.e. when initial capacity levels are in region S 2 ) both firms do not invest. Highly asymmetric initial conditions call for investment by the firm holding the smaller capacity stock (with investment levels dictated by ϕ(k)). Finally, in region S 1 both firms invest so as to attain a relative capacity level k * . 
The structure of strategy combination induces a simple form for expected marginal value. After a one period deviation, both firms will reach the capacity level k * in two periods. Thus, deviating in the first period for instance by investing less, saves on investment costs at the expense of reduced equilibrium profits in the second period only. As we show the proof of Theorem 1, condition (4.1) becomes:
θg , the relative capacity (
1+g ) falls into region I when there is growth and (4.1)
translates into
from which we derive the value of k * i by using the fact that k * −i = k * i .
As we discussed in section 3.1, in a symmetric duopoly, firms withhold capacity in equilibrium whenever capacity exceeds the threshold m 3 . This is indeed the case as
We now state the main result of this section:
Theorem 1: Strategy y * is the unique MPE (in the class of investment strategies that are homogeneous of degree 1).
Proof : See the appendix, sections 11, 12 and 13. ¥
Free Entry Equilibrium
The model developed in the previous section is still unsatisfactory as the number of firms is artificially fixed. We shall now extend our analysis to allow for new entrants to the market. Let us assume a new firm entering the market incurs an entry cost F > 0. We shall also assume that at every time period, at most one firm can enter the market (see Mankiw and Whinston (1986) ). Note that under the strategy combination y * (k) analyzed in the preceding section, firms reach a symmetric level of installed capacity in one time period, provided the initial levels of installed capacity do not exceed
A third firm (the entrant) with zero installed capacity would only enter if the discounted profits from short-run Cournot competition (which are in effect reduced by entry) exceed investment costs. As a preliminary step, we extend the analysis for a Cournot oligopoly with n firms (n > 2), in which n − 1 firms (the incumbents) have symmetric levels of installed capacity and the n-th firm is the entrant.
Equilibrium For Symmetric Oligopoly
As is customary, we shall denote by q −i the aggregate output of all firms other than firm i, i.e.
In the unique symmetric equilibrium, q * i = Cournot equilibrium profits for firm i in each region are as follows:
The symmetric investment strategy y * introduced above can be easily extended to the symmetric oligopoly structure with n firms. The most important change in the definition of y * (n) relates to the target level k * which becomes a function of n, say k * (n). As discussed in the proof of Theorem 1, at the target level k * (n) the marginal cost of investment is equal to the expected marginal value, i.e.:
As in the two-firm case, this leads to the condition:
Since the relative capacity (
1+g ) falls into region I when there is growth, this condition translates
To summarize, the strategy combination y * (n) will be in equilibrium whenever
θg . Moreover, the long run equilibrium level of capacities in the relative capacity space is k * (n).
Free Entry Equilibrium
With n − 1 incumbents in the market following strategy y * (n) the entrant (the n-th firm) starts out with no installed capacity k n = 0. Entry is profitable if and only if:
Note that since the incumbents follow strategy combination y * , we have k −n = (n − 1)k * (n). Suppose the incumbent's relative capacity (that is, k * (n − 1)) is such that
≤ k * (n) so that when demand grows both the entrant and the incumbents invests so to attain a level of installed capacity equal to k * (n). The entrant's value function is:
Substitution into (5.1) results in entry being profitable if and only if
where we use the fact that 1−β(1+θg) β = r − θg. This condition simply says that the expected net profit per period must exceed the "annualized" fixed cost (i.e. F (r − θg)). Note that since the strategy y * induces excess capacity, we have k * (n) > m n+1 and
After several algebraic manipulations (see appendix, Section 14) condition (5.2) can be expressed as:
Note that H(n) is strictly monotone decreasing in n and lim n→∞ H(n) = −F (r − θg) < 0. Letn be such that H(n) = 0. That is,n
The free entry equilibrium number of firms n * can be defined as n * = bnc where bxc stands for the greatest integer that is less than or equal to x. The free entry equilibrium number of firms decreases with increasing fixed cost F , and increases with increasing relative profitability of investments in the market (i.e. the ratio m κ ). The free entry equilibrium number of firms increases with increasing probability of demand growth, decreasing discount and depreciation rates
Benchmark for Capacity Expansion
In this section, we are interested in comparing the socially optimal levels of investment and those induced under the Free-entry MPE equilibrium derived in section 5. Assume an aggregate level of installed capacity K ∈ (m, m(1 + g)) and firms behaving as price takers.
When there is growth, social surplus is
where the first term is industry's aggregate profit and the second is consumer surplus. With no growth, industry's profit is zero and S(K) = m 2 2 . Hence,
with probability 1 − θ
The socially optimal level of capacity K s is the solution to:
The first order condition is
As remarked in section 4.1, under demand growth, a firm's marginal value is decreasing in the aggregate level of installed capacity. However, in such scenario, consumer surplus is increasing in the aggregate level of installed capacity. Thus, socially optimal investment is greater than equilibrium investment.
Socially Optimal Investment in a Dynamic Setting
For an aggregate level of capacity K and demand parameter σ −1 , social surplus is:
Note that social surplus is homogeneous of degree 1. To see this note for example, when K < m σ that
where we abuse notation by setting k = σK is the relative value of aggregate capacity. Given an aggregate detrended capacity stock k, the social surplus is
Consider a policy that is aimed at maintaining a capacity stock k. The expected discounted social welfare W (k) can be expressed recursively as follows:
and
where S(k) replaces S(k, 1) to simplify notation. Since there are no diseconomies of scale, the social planner would optimally only use one firm and the optimal level of investment k s is the solution to:
Assuming k ∈ (m, m(1 + g)) the first order condition is:
From (6.1) and (6.2) we obtain
so that the first order condition can be rewritten as,
which results in
and for n = n * ,
That is, the market fails to induce the socially optimal level of capacity. However, the magnitude of this failure varies greatly as a function of the number of firms in a free entry equilibrium. The comparative statics on n * indicate that the likelihood of insufficient capacity in equilibrium increases with decreasing probability of demand growth, increasing discount and depreciation rates and/or increasing investment and/or production costs. Note that as entry costs become negligible, the equilibrium number of firms in the market increases and the insufficiency of equilibrium investments is mitigated. From an individual firm's perspective, incumbents see their investment incentives greatly weakened by entry. However, a "tragedy of the commons"-like effect takes place: incumbent firms would rather see lower levels of aggregate investment but it does not payoff to further restrict investment unilaterally. As a result, aggregate levels of investment increase with lower entry costs.
7 Public Policy Implications and Discussion.
Public Policy Implications
The ingredients of the policy conundrum we study are all too clear: having a certain level of excess capacity is socially valuable (as it serves to protect against unexpected supply disruptions) but, as we have shown, this situation is not necessarily compatible with the market incentives for firms participating in the provision of the critical infrastructure. Some form of intervention may be warranted in order to induce socially optimal levels of capacity expansion.
In the recent debates regarding oil refining capacity in the U.S., some policy makers have advocated forced divestitures in the hope that a less concentrated industry will give way to increased investment activity and higher levels of excess capacity (see Moss (2007) ). Our model indicates that when there are n incumbents in a free entry equilibrium, splitting one of the incumbents into two separate firms, increases aggregate capacity as
θg , the capacity utilization factor CF is:
Note that altering industry structure by splitting one of the incumbents does not affect the equilibrium capacity utilization factor. As we have argued before, idle capacity provides a form of insurance. A forced divestiture has a rather marginal impact (i.e. of the order of 1 n 2 ) on the aggregate level of idle capacity (1−CF )nk * (n). Interestingly, tax and depreciation incentives aimed at decreasing investment cost κ, achieve both an increase in aggregate investment and a reduction of the equilibrium capacity utilization factor.
Lessons for Electricity Markets
It has been our intention to cast this paper in a way that is not necessarily sector-specific. However, we believe the main qualitative insights obtained from our model may be applicable to electricity markets.
At first sight, experts in electricity markets may rightly consider our representation of short-term equilibrium outcomes as too stylized. However, a connection between the different outcomes discussed in section 3.1 and short-run equilibrium in electricity markets could be established as follows: suppose a two-block load duration curve (e.g. "peak" and "baseload") is used. Depending upon which block is active, relative capacity in the short run would be shifted upwards or downwards in Figure 1 , along a ray from the origin. Region I is associated with "peak" demand in which case, in equilibrium, oligopolists sell all of their capacity and spot prices are relatively high. Region IV is associated with "baseload" demand and high levels of installed capacity for both firms. In this case, both firms withhold a fraction of their capacity. Region II is associated with "baseload" demand and high level of installed capacity by firm 2. In this case, only firm 2 has incentive to withhold capacity. Finally, in region III, same as II with the roles of firm 1 and 2 reversed. Thus, the marginal value of capacity for firm 1 is only positive in "peak" demand (i.e. region I) or in "baseload" periods when the relative installed capacity of firm 2 is large. As asymmetric capacity levels disappear in the long-run, our model is one in which the marginal value of capacity is only positive in "peak" demand periods.
In this sense, our characterization of investments suggests that artificially low values of the price cap p exacerbate the market's failure to provide socially optimal levels of investment. This coincides with Joskow's (2007) . However, our results indicate that socially optimal levels of investment will not be induced by simply increasing price caps. This contrasts with a conventional wisdom according to which, relaxing price caps induces socially optimal investment. Note also that low values of θ (probability of demand growth) exacerbate the inefficiency of equilibrium investments. Insurance against no demand growth is a policy intervention that could mitigate the problem. Interestingly, electricity markets seem poised to innovate in this regard (see Cramton and Stoft (2005) , Oren (2005) , Creti and Fabra (2007) and Hobbs et al. (2007) ). Various proposals (some already operational) for "capacity markets" involve the use of auctions for procuring call option contracts on energy during a planning horizon of several years into the future. These contracts effectively shift the risks of no demand growth to consumers of electricity. Moreover, these long-term auctions may reduce entry costs, as they make it easier for entrants to finance investments.
Limitations of the Model
The assumption of (constant) marginal investment cost is a simplification, as in reality, capacity additions are discrete and the cost structure may be highly non-linear. We have shown that in a model with constant marginal investment costs, firms are able to invest in equilibrium in a "conservative" fashion. Incorporating lumpiness and economies of scale are likely to reinforce the "conservative" trait of equilibrium strategies. For example, if the excess capacity margin is relatively low, lumpy investments are bound to generate a situation of high capacity margins and low profit margins.
As Allaz and Vila (1993) have shown, forward markets alter the nature of Cournot competition. In particular, they showed that there are equilibria with high levels of forward contracting and perfectly competitive equilibrium outcomes. Note that, if the short run competition yields perfectly competitive outcomes, firms have weak incentives to invest unless forward premiums are high enough. However, Ferreira (2003) has shown that in a dynamic model for competition in spot and forward markets with many opportunities for trading, there are equilibria where firms are able to fully exercise their market power in a similar manner to a static Cournot game with only spot trades. Forward contracts may also serve to hedge price risk for the firms investments over their lifetime. However, in practice, forward contracts have relatively short terms that never quite match the lifetime of investments in critical infrastructure (e.g. a refinery or a power plant may have a lifetime of 30+ years and there are no future contracts in either oil or electricity for such duration).
More Complex Equilibria
In the preceding sections, we have characterized the levels of investment can be expected when firms (although strategic in the short run) behave "almost competitively" in deciding on new investments.
That is to say, though firms certainly exercise market power in the short-run, their investment decisions are dependent upon simple summary statistics, namely the current level of capacity stocks. In theory, we can not rule out the existence of other more complex equilibria with possibly higher levels of aggregate capacity. However, as we shall argue below, this is unlikely to alter the validity of our conclusions.
Entry Deterrence
We will now argue that collusive equilibria (aimed at entry deterrence) exist only under very restrictive conditions on the primitives of the model. To illustrate, suppose n * − 1 incumbent firms implicitly collude by maintaining a high level of capacity k 0 > k * (n * ) in order to deter entry. In the event of any deviation (i.e. when at least one firm does not maintain a capacity level k 0 ) all firms revert to investing according to y * = y * (n * ). This collusive strategy combination can be described as follows: extremely high levels of excess capacity (i.e. k 0 >> k * (n * )). This is unlikely to be profitable for incumbents. In other words, an incumbent may be better off by deviating from the implicit collusive commitment to maintain high capacity (thus allowing entry).
We now provide a simple numerical illustration (the details of which are given in the appendix, section To deter entry, it must be true that for a potential entrant i,
This inequality implies that m < 1.5096. Without checking whether a deviation for an incumbent is profitable or not, the range of values for m that allow for the collusive entry-deterrence strategy to be in equilibrium is restricted to m ∈ [1.5, 1.5096).
Non-homogeneous Investment Strategies
In section 4, we restricted our analysis to Markovian investment strategies that are homogeneous of degree 1. However, there may exist other symmetric equilibria in strategies that do not verify this property. Under such type of strategies, investment decisions are a function of both the values of installed capacity K and, the demand parameter σ. Suppose Y (K, σ −1 ) is a symmetric, non-homogeneous MPE that induces levels of excess capacity that exceed those induced by the homogeneous strategy y * (k) analyzed in section 4. Consider the following hybrid strategy: 
Conclusions
In critical infrastructure sectors (e.g. energy, telecommunications, transportation) maintaining certain level of excess capacity is socially valuable (as it serves to protect against unexpected supply disruptions) but not necessarily compatible with the incentives for individual firms in the market.
In this paper, we have developed a dynamic oligopoly model with a stochastically growing demand to analyze the inherent tension between market-based incentives and the ability to withstand major supply disruptions in a critical infrastructure where investment has long lags. The main conclusion of the paper is that the market fails to induce the socially optimal level of capacity. However, the magnitude of this failure varies greatly as a function of entry costs and the relative profitability of investments in the market (as measured by the ratio of maximum markup over production costs and investment costs). In general, the likelihood of insufficient capacity in equilibrium increases with decreasing probability of demand growth, increasing discount and depreciation rates and/or increasing investment and/or production costs. Our model indicates that altering industry structure by splitting one of the incumbents does not affect the equilibrium capacity utilization factor because strategic capacity withholding behavior is also affected by the structural change. Our model indicates that a forced divestiture has a rather marginal impact on the aggregate level of idle capacity. Interestingly, tax and depreciation incentives aimed at decreasing investment cost κ, achieve both an increase in aggregate investment and a reduction of the equilibrium capacity utilization factor. In the context of electricity markets, our characterization of investments suggests that artificially low price caps exacerbate the market's failure to provide socially optimal levels of investment. However, our results indicate that socially optimal levels of investment will not be induced by simply increasing price caps. This contrasts with a conventional wisdom according to which, relaxing price caps induces socially optimal investment. Insurance against no demand growth is in this case, a more effective policy intervention.
Interestingly, electricity markets seem poised to innovate in this regard as various proposals (some already operational) for "capacity markets" effectively allocate the risk of uncertain demand growth to consumers.
Appendix: Derivation of Short Term Equilibrium
The first order conditions for the unconstrained case are:
(q 1 , q 2 ) = m − σ(q 1 + 2q 2 ) = 0 Therefore, the unconstrained best replies are:
Thus, the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium is q * 1 = q * 2 = m 3σ .
• In region
• In region IV = { (K 1 , K 2 )| K i > m 3σ }, the constrained best reply functions are BR 0 1 (q 2 ) = min{K 1 ; v 1 ( k| y * ), the expected discounted value of net revenues earned by firm 1 if strategy y * is followed by both players upon initial condition k * . We define BR 2 (k 1 ) = 
Region S 1
If the initial relative capacities are given by δk 0 i ≤ k * , we assume firm 1's capacity at the beginning of the next period after investment is k 1 = δk 0 1 + y 1 , where y 1 = k 1 − δk 0 1 is firm 1's investment decision when the initial capacities are (k 0 1 , k 0 2 ). According to strategy y * , firm 2's decision is to achieve a relative capacity level of k * . So firm 1's objective function is 
The derivative D(k 1 ) of the objective function above with respect to k 1 is:
Since firm 1's short term equilibrium revenue R * 1 satisfies ∂R * 1 (k 1 ,k 2 ) ∂k 1 = 0 in region III and IV, it is never optimal for k 1 to exceed BR 1 (k * ). For BR −1 2 (k * ) < k 1 ≤ BR 1 (k * ),
where C(k * ) = β[θ(1 + g)v 1 ( continuous, the objective function is also continuous. So for all k 1 ≤ BR 1 (k * ), k * is the optimal target for relative capacity when initial relative capacity (k 0 1 , k 0 2 ) is in region S 1 . The remainder of the proof is available in paper's online companion.
